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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the evolution of the European Union in the 
economic and financial field during the global crisis that stroke Europe, from 
January 2008 until December 2012. My argument is that the European Union 
has faced certain political and economical imbalances since its beginnings in 
1992 which have worsen the European economic and financial scenario. These 
imbalances  -  rooted  in  the  EU  architecture  –  were  the  result  of  a  primary 
political choice: building a European market based on neoliberal values and 
setting aside any political controversy that may have caused a slowdown in the 
economic  and  financial  integration.  Since  1992,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  has 
shown some incongruities which were not resolved in the following two decades. 
Moreover, the decision-making process became more intricate so that Europe 
faced  the  worst  post-war  financial  crisis  without  the  instruments  to  answer 
rapidly  to  the  financial  speculation.  The  ECB,  following  its  price  stability 
mandate,  was  not  able  to  react  with  counter-cyclical  measures,  thus 
exacerbating  the  financial  imbalances  between  Northern  and  Southern 
European States. After an economic “perfect storm”, EU Member States need to 
have enough farsightedness to implement some fundamental reforms in order to 
give the necessary means to EU institutions to erect an efficient firewall against 
financial speculations. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted now that Europe is facing the worst crisis since the 
establishment  of  the  European  Community  in  1957.  This  statement  usually 
implies that this crisis is still primarily an economic issue; the political crisis 
come  afterwards  as  “an  unwanted  consequence”  that  threats  not  only  the 
Eurozone, but also, the European Union (EU) itself. David Cameron's recent 
speech (2013) on the future of the United Kingdom in Europe testifies for the 
enormous  challenge  EU  has  to  cope  with,  particularly  in  those  countries 
recognized as “euroskeptic.”  
  In this paper I would like to emphasize that it would be more appropriate 
to reverse the cause-effect mechanism, i.e. the political crisis (that is the political 
decision to adapt the European Union architecture to the neoliberal principle of 
the self-regulated financial market) preceded the economic crisis. At the same 
time the aim of this paper is to trace a comprehensive description of the last four 
years events, trying to systemize the huge amount of information that deals with 
the EU crisis.  
  For that reason I start with a brief review of the last steps of the economic 
integration in Europe, that is the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. At a later stage, I will discuss the issue of who is in charge in European 
Union: the problem of a clear-cut distinction of functions between the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council could account for the 
slowness in responding to the sovereign debt crisis that pounded Europe in the 
last years. Moreover, the role of the European Central Bank will be analyzed in 
order to assess its response to the multifaceted problem of the speculation on the 
European sovereign debt. 
  The description of the measures implemented by the so-called “troika” 
(European Union, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund) is 
aimed to define how the institutional and political shortcomings that Europe has 
faced since the Maastricht Treaty approval may have influenced the economic 
situation in which the EU is stuck at the beginning of 2013.  Finally, I draw a 
conclusion on the possible remedies, especially from the political and financial 
point of view. 
 
2. Maastricht and the neoliberal triumph 
  “We believe that it is time ‘to transform relations as a whole among the 
Member States into a European Union... and invest this union with the necessary 
means  of  action”  (Bulletin  of  European  Community,  quoted  in  Blair  2005, 
p.122). With these words, in a letter dated 19 April 1990, the former French and 
German presidents, Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl, expressed their will 
for a more united Europe. The Berlin wall fell a year before and the relationship 
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result was the Maastricht Treaty, which built, for the first time, an economic 
union, throughout the cornerstones of the well-known convergence criteria and 
of the four freedoms (capitals, goods, services and people). 
  The year 1992 marked a political turning point for Europe, as it was 1951, 
with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Six countries, whose 
economic and political institutions were on the brink of a traumatic collapse 
after  World War II, reached a historical agreement in order to sta bilize the 
Alsace-Lorrain  situation  between  France  and  Germany.  This  diplomatic 
agreement  was  the  first  part  of  a  more  global  project,  i.e.  to  contribute  to 
economic expansion and to raise the standard of living throughout the common 
market for coal and steel, capitalizing the economic support of the Marshall 
Plan. The first result for Western European Countries to reach the pre-War level 
of GDP at the beginning of 1950 (Carlucci and Cavone, 2004). 
  After  forty  one  years,  the  path  traced  by  Jean  Monnet  and  Robert 
Schuman seemed lined with roses: the neofunctionalist perspective was near to 
win the bet of an economic and monetary integration bounded with the political 
union. However, some difficulties in the agreement
1 persisted, as testified by the 
financial attack on the most fragile countries in the international market. An 
attack that was a symptom of the difficulties of Member States (MSs) in acting 
together: this shyness, typified by the unnecessary (legally speaking) referendum 
held in France – after the Danish No in a recent referendum - cost very much to 
MSs in economic terms, due to the uncertainty in the European financial context. 
The  same  happened  during  the  actual  crisis  with  the  Greek  referendum  on 
austerity  measures:  this  time  Papandreou  was  forced  to  cancel  it  due  to 
international pressures and internal opposition.  
  If  the  triumph  of  the  neoliberal  vision  seemed  to  be  clear  for  some 
analysts (Pollak, 2011) at the end of the millennium, two major issues were still 
unresolved: the sovereignty of MSs and the willingness to counterbalance this 
“victory” with another “ideology” of a regulated capitalism, which had a strong 
support among the Commissioners (Hoege, 1998). In the first case, not only the 
foreign policy remained in the sphere of intergovernmentalism with the CSFP, 
but the fiscal union  was not in the European agenda either: obviously, the Union 
was  rather  economic  than  political.  It  was  able  to defend  free  movement  of 
goods, capital, services and (lastly) people rather than stimulate a grand bargain 
on the institutional architecture of Europe. For many years, the precondition to 
reach a new agreement (the Lisbon Treaty) was to avoid any allusion to these 
issues. In the second case, few principles were marked, above all: the separation 
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between  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  and  the  political  power  and  the 
stability  of  prices,  as  asked  by  Germany.  Given  the  issue  of  the  Southern 
European  competitiveness  endangered  by  the  unification  of  West  and  East 
Germany, the main task for the European Economic Community (which was 
abolished with the treaty of Lisbon) was to avoid competitive devaluations. The 
Stability Growth Pact (SGP) was created in 1997 to serve this purpose, hoping, 
at the same time, that the most financially permissive States would implement 
those  structural  reforms  (notably  labour  market  reform  and  retirement  age 
reform) that could permit a better stability in the public finance. 
  The mechanism was all but automatic. The sanctions for an MS had to be 
decided in the Council of Ministers: rather than pure financial considerations, 
what prevailed in the Council were political and national calculations, such as 
those  made  by  Italy  when  France  and  Germany  faced  an  infringement 
procedure.  This  lack  of  automatism  –  that  is,  the  predominance  of  national 
politics  among  European  politics  and  economics  –  was  criticized  by  some 
analysts (Heipretz and Verdun, 2003), while others stated that a focus on the 
growth  rather  than  on  strict  boundaries  would  be  more  important  (Quadro 
Curzio, 2004). The tension between politics and economics continued until the 
recent crisis. 
 
3. The Stability and Growth Pact 
  After  a  few  years  of  peaceful  existence,  the  “P”  of  so  called  PIIGS, 
Portugal, opened a harsh debate about the usefulness of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP), a measure contained in the SGP, that implied a sanction for 
those countries with more than 3% annual deficit of GDP. If only Portugal faced 
this sanction, probably the implementation would not be a serious problem; the 
fact that France and Germany soon after went under observation of the European 
Commission  for  their  own  deficit  turned  the  situation  into  a  political  (and 
sovereignty) problem. These three countries together with Italy used their weight 
in the Council to block the sanctions. The European Court of Justice admitted 
that they had the right to do it with the judgment C-27-04 (Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, 2004), despite the willingness of the Commission to 
assert its commitment to the Treaty when inflicted the sanction.  
  Why did this clash between Commission and MSs happen? The answer 
lays in the political nature of the EDP. As Heipertz and Verdun (2003) and 
Leblond (2006) state, the SGP was created in order to ensure the participation of 
Germany in the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, if this was the 
goal of SGP, and in particular of the EDP's sanctioning mechanism, “then its 
political relevance would diminish after Germany had joined” (Leblond, 2006, p. 
974): nonetheless, this “political relevance” was an intergovernmental relevance, 
rather than an European one. The discretion in the application of sanctions was a 
reflection of the latent France’s and Italy's fear of sovereignty loss. Interestingly A POLITICAL CRISIS IN AN ECONOMIC TEMPEST       109 
 
enough, Jabko (2010) claimed that even the EMU was, in a way, a tentative to 
reduce  the  assertiveness  of  Germany  and  the  European  leadership  of 
Bundesbank. Once Germany was incorporated in the future Eurozone, the issue 
was  just  to  bargain  the  power  relationship  between  MSs;  there  were  not 
European ideas about the future of the economic stability of Europe.  
  It was Germany that pushed to transform deficit reducing policies into real 
European  policies;  several  years  after  its  denial  to  a  European  infringement 
procedure,  the  German  Finance  Minister,  Wolfgang  Schaeuble  (AFP,  2013), 
insisted with other MSs that there were not different paths from those traced by 
the European Union. However, in this case, the aim of the German government 
is not developing a European economic agenda; rather it seems that European 
policies  are  used  for  internal  matters,  especially  on  the  eve  of  a  legislative 
election. 
  In  fact,  Merkel’s  toughness  on  this  side  hides  a  more  complicated 
problem, namely the necessity for Germany – the country that resisted better to 
the turmoil and which gained the greatest bargain power among MSs – to appear 
strong  enough  outside  its  borders  in  order  to  be  not  be  perceived  as  weak 
internally.  
  However, as shown by Leblond (2006), on the one hand, investors do not 
consider an excessive non-structural deficit as a negative fact per se, so that even 
an automatic binding procedure will not have the effects supposed to create (a 
balance between revenues and cash outflow by increasing interest rates which 
should push any Government to carry out a restrictive policy). On the other 
hand, EDP is not unanimously considered the best way to force countries to be 
more respectful to their national budget. One can argue that the political nature 
of EDP itself transforms the way this process is seen on the exchange market: if 
states, especially the most powerful, such as France and Germany, have the right 
to refuse (or accept) the excessive deficit procedure for European Commission, 
then the credibility of this mechanism is inevitably weakened. Anyhow, it is also 
important to evaluate the effects of a sanction of 0,2 % of GDP on the national 
budget, in a context with no sustainable growth (as the case of some Member 
States): adding a fine to the deficit means exacerbating the state of finances 
deepening the deficit itself, instead of resolving the problem, even because a 
restrictive fiscal policy is costly, from an electoral and social point of view; for 
that reason, a strong MS prefers to “fight” in the European arena, as it was for 
Germany and France, rather than make their citizens pay a European fine. In this 
case,  those  States  which  had  the  means  to  stop  an  unfavorable  decision, 
preferred to focus on their own economic sovereignty and on their self-interest. 
The Commission, the guardian of the treaties, remained a step under the Council, 
the political and intergovernmental organ of the European Union. 
  Another interesting aspect is that the monetary union was not followed 
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lays on the power to impose taxes by sovereign States, is still a divisive issue: 
each MS is jealous of its uniqueness in this field. Nevertheless, Uhlig (2003) 
demonstrates  that  in  a  context  like  that  of  the  European  Union  where  the 
monetary  and  fiscal  authorities  are  unable  to  commit,  the  non-cooperation 
between  them  can  lead  to  significantly  inferior  outcomes.  The  same  worries 
were advanced by Tommaso Padoa Schioppa (2004, Pisani-Ferry, 2006).  
  The suspension of the EDP, and more generally of the SGP, did not turn 
into an economic crisis mostly because the excessive deficit was not considered 
an  overwhelming  problem  by  the  global  market  (Leblond,  2006).  As  a 
consequence, why should MSs have deepened their integration? MSs national 
sovereignty and national bargaining power in the EU arena were saved, at least 
until a major crisis erupted in 2008: the necessity to respond quickly to the 
attack of the speculation in 2003 was just an unthinkable nightmare. The Lisbon 
Treaty confirmed the tendency to see in a long, exhausting, bargaining procedure 
the  only  way  to  achieve  an  agreement,  based  on  the  unanimously  accepted 
lowest common denominator. While shifting part of the policy-making power in 
the  European  arena  thanks  to  the  co-decision  procedure,  Member  States 
preferred to maintain fiscal policy in their own backyard. The European Union 
was not simply policy without politics: it was policy with national politics and 
without  European  politics;  a  lion  without  teeth;  a  Leviathan  unable  to  scare 
anyone. 
 
4. Who is in charge? 
  This chapter tries to describe briefly the decision-making procedure in the 
European Union, underlining the difficulties in reaching quick agreements at the 
European level. The issue of timing is not good per se, but for the item I am 
treating it is basic. As the description of the crisis from 2008 to 2012 would 
explain, the  slow  response  to  global  market  (and  also  to  global  speculation) 
creates a vicious circle, where the isolation suffered by MSs played an important 
role in worsening the sovereign debt crisis
2. 
  The complexity of the institutional architecture is due to the new concept 
of representation that emerged in Europe. On the one hand, the Council of the 
European Union, that is the Council of Ministers, is the expression of functional 
representation. In this case, with the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
initial pure intergovernmentalism was overcome by the system of qualified 
majority; until 2014 the approval of a decision requires: majority of countries 
(50%) if the proposal is made by the Commission, or else 67% if the proposal is 
not made by the Commission and 74% of voting weights, as provided by article 
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205 of the Treaty establishing the European Community; every country is able to 
check if the majority include the 62% of the European population. We are facing 
a Machiavellian system which tries to balance the power of the most populated 
and richest countries (Germany, United Kingdom, France and Italy) with the 
need of representation of the smallest country; this is an overwhelming, if not 
contradictory,  attempt  to  balance  the  efficiency  in  the  outcomes  and  the 
democratic representativeness. On the other hand, the necessity to give voice to 
popular  representation  pushed  European  members  to  increase  the  legislative 
power of European Parliament (EP). This was made through the aforementioned 
co-decision procedure that became, with the Lisbon Treaty, ordinary legislative 
procedure, i.e. what used to be the exception in decision-making has become the 
norm for the majority of the policy areas. However, a major problem arises when 
we  analyze  what  really  happened  at  the  European  level  during  the  last  four 
years.  
  The  2008  mortgage  crisis  was  transformed  into  a  sovereign  debt 
speculation, which hurt many European countries. In this context and despite the 
new assertiveness demonstrated during Eu balance debate, what EP was (un)able 
to do reflects its low capacity to influence the debate over the States’ bailout. As 
an example, the austerity reforms proposed and implemented by the conservative 
government  in  Portugal
3  and  the  balanced  budget  inserted  in  the  Spanish 
Constitution with an agreement of the Popular Party and the Socialists were 
“imposed” by EU and IMF, on the one hand, and the Central Bank on the other, 
with the implicit threat to exclude these countries from the European System of 
Financial  Supervisor  (ESFS)  and  without  any  kind  of  popular  consultation 
(Tremlett, 2011). The same occurred, despite some differences, with Greece and 
Italy.  Moreover, the approval  of the  ESFS  was tied  up  with  the  decision  of 
Bundestag, at first, and Slovakian Parliament in second instance (Merli, 2011). 
Although  these  events  could  not  be  pertinent  to  typify  the  decision-making 
process, it shows how, during a severe period of crisis (the first one, since the 
adoption of the Euro), the EP is overruled by national governments. Not by 
chance, if we transfer the national debate into the European arena, we will find 
that it is the European Council the place where all decisions are taken.  
  Despite  the  co-decision  process  that  gives  the  Commission  and  the 
Parliament  substantial  weight,  the  “Council-centric  view”  is  today  the  most 
obvious  option  in  the  decision-making  process.  How  can  this  fact  be 
demonstrated? The answer lays on the EP election. The EP members are elected 
in a national party and to a national party and they have to justify every choice to 
national electors. Would a member of the Popolo della Libert￠- PDL (Italian 
conservative  party)  distinguish  from  the  decision  taken  by  his  leader  in  the 
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European  Council?  Would  an  Italian  member  vote  against  an  EPP  national 
leader (i.e. Berlusconi), even if other national leaders (i.e. Angela Merkel) which 
belong to the same European family, ask to vote in a way that would contradict 
national interest? These are all rhetoric questions that do not need an answer.     
But, despite the fact that “legislative behavior in the EP is structured more 
by party affiliation than national affiliation” (Hix, 2001, p. 684), it is also true 
that EP legislators must devote much more attention to their home party and its 
leadership if candidates are chosen by a small inner circle of the party leadership 
rather than a ballot of all members or by regional party organizations (Faas, 
2003, p. 844). Moreover, it was also noted (ibidem) that the national government 
pushes very hard to have its members in the EP vote the compromise reached in 
the Council. 
 
Figure 1. Stylised illustration of the transmission mechanism from official 
interest rates 
 
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2010 
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  Until now, no mention has been made about the role of the Commission, 
the  guardian  of  the  Treaties,  which  also  has  no  negligible  functions  in  the 
European context such as proposing new laws to Parliament and the Council, 
managing the EU's budget and allocating funding, enforcing EU law (together 
with the Court of Justice), representing the EU internationally by negotiating 
agreements  between  the  EU  and  other  countries.  During  the  crisis,  the 
Commission has come under stronger challenge in this crisis than ever before 
(Huges, 2012). 
Finally,  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  had  a  prominent  position 
among other institutions. As mentioned above, its recognized role is linked to 
the monetarist theory, that is the strict control of consumer price inflation. An 
example of this willingness to maintain price stability can be found in  
2008 during the US subprime crisis, when the ECB decided to reach an interest 
rate of 4,25% (see Figure 1).  
  Its particularity in the European institutional architecture is, on the one 
hand, its independence from the political power and, on the other hand, the lack 
of accountability. The latter feature is strictly connected to the former (Sibert, 
2009). Accountability is often seen by ECB as a way to explain  and  justify  its  
actions, but, at the same time, it is not possible to know the report of the ECB 
meeting  as  well  as  the  votes  in  the  ECB  (if  a  real  voting  procedure  exists) 
(ibidem). The only accountability mechanism is the annual report submitted to 
the EP; moreover, ECB representatives participate in the EP’s committees at the 
request of its members or on its own initiative (Article 284.3 of the Treaty and 
Article  15.3  of  the  Statute).  Nonetheless,  neither  the  EP  nor  the  Council  of 
Ministers have the political power to influence in any way the ECB mandate. De 
Hann  (2000,  p.  405)  analyzed  the  problem  at  the  beginning  of  the  ECB 
activities,  reaching  the  conclusion  that  ECB  was  “more  reluctant  to  be 
accountable and transparent with the danger of hiding some of their strategies”, 
with respect to Anglo-Saxon central banks.  
  Following the Bundesbank model, the strict independence from political 
power is guaranteed by the article 127 of TFEU that imposes the price stability 
as “the primary objective” of the ECB and European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB)
4. In order to ensure that the political influence does not overcome the 
decision-making of ECB, any kind of loans to national or local institution is 
prohibited. However, how did the ECB react when the financial crisis reached its 
peak in 2009 and 2010? Did it coordinate its decisions with other political 
institutions? Did it follow its monetarist philosophy? The answers to these 
questions will be given in the following sections. 
  In this puzzling context, the economic crisi s highlighted the political 
incapacity of European institutions to react with coordinated measures to save 
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the monetary union. The self-assertion of the Council of Ministers in the last 
months of 2011 showed that three years of motionlessness fostered the rise of 
national-based interests, especially of those countries which were traditionally 
not  involved  in  the  European  project  and  that  now  preferred  to  look  at  the 
national  arena  rather  than  deepen  the  integration  process,  i.e.  Great  Britain 
(Hutton, 2011).  
 
5. The crisis and the response to it 
  When the housing bubble burst at the beginning of 2008 in the US, the 
crisis went global immediately. In Europe, the response to this unexpected crash 
was different from nation to nation, without a common plan: different were the 
problems, different were the solutions adopted. The government of UK, after the 
bailout of Northern Rock in 2007, injected £37bn in Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), Lloyds TSB and HBOS just before the opening of the G-20 summit in 
November 2008, where the policy agenda did not in fact go much beyond the 
pre-existing international initiatives that had already been developed in more 
technocratic  international  bodies.  In  this  way,  the  analysis  [of  the  summit’s 
official communiqu￩] highlights how far short the summit fell from expectations 
that  it  might  set  a  new  agenda  for  ambitious  and  innovative  international 
financial reform (Helleiner and Pagliari, 2009, p. 276). 
  After UK, other national plans were predisposed by Sweden, Denmark, 
Portugal, Greece, Holland, without the intervention of ECB (Russo, 2011). 
  Meanwhile, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the 
European Central Bank, faithful to its monetarist mandate, decided an increase 
of the interest rate to the historic high of 4,25%. During what was perceived in 
2009 as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression (IHS, 2009), the 
ECB was not eager to adapt its strategy to a mutating financial context.   
  In the US, after the controversial approval of the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP), $7.700 millions were pumped into the bank market with an 
interest  rate  near  to  0%  (Da  Rold,  2011);  the  decision-making  problem, 
especially at the end of the Bush presidency and after the mid-term election in 
2010, when Obama lost the majority in Congress, were patent and similar to the 
European institutions indecision, but “the strength of American political system 
allows a safety navigation, while the European path is proceeding throughout the 
tempest”(Prodi, 2011). The difference between the US and the European Union 
is  in  the  fragmentation  of  the  interventions:  with  a  stable  political  context, 
although divided between Republicans and Democrats and despite the recent 
shocking downgrading of the rating, the speculation on the US stopped within 
two years. At the beginning of December 2011 the attention is in the downgrade 
of the Eurozone (Euronews, 2011b). So, why is Europe still in danger?  
  In  October  2009,  the  former  prime  minister  of  Greece,  George 
Papandreou, announced that the annual deficit of the State would be 12,7%. The A POLITICAL CRISIS IN AN ECONOMIC TEMPEST       115 
 
conservative  party  altered  the  financial  indicators  of  Greece  to  enter  in  the 
Eurozone and the socialist Prime Minister needed, at the time, 400 $ billion to 
cover the Greek debt. Within two months, Greek bonds became “junk”, but the 
first intervention of Ecofin and International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrived only 
at the beginning of May and it was too shy to convince the global markets. 
Within a week (from 1
st of May to 8
th), IMF and EU agreed on a €110 billion 
loan with an interest rate of 5.5%: the main condition was the implementation of 
austerity  measures.  On  the  9
th  of  May  2010,  a  new  European  fund,  called 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), was created in order to erect a 
firewall against  financial speculation  on  Greek  debt.  In  November  2011,  the 
EFSF  guaranteed  up  to  30%  of  new  issues  from  the  troubled  Eurozone 
Government in order to raise the funds needed to provide loans to countries in 
financial difficulties, to intervene in the debt primary market and in the debt 
secondary markets, to act on the basis of a precautionary program, to support 
recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments including 
those  in  non-programmed  countries  (European  Council,  2011a).  The  second 
emergency fund, approved by all Member States, was the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). It was created on the 10
th of May 2010 “with 
a view to preserving the financial stability of the European Union” (article 1) 
(Official Journal of the European Union, 2010).  
  The panic generated by the black Friday of the 8
th of May 2010 was a 
reaction to the slowness of the EU and mostly of the Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
who apparently waited for the North Westphalia election before the bailout of 
Greece (Hall and Waterfield, 2011).  
One year after, the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, seeing no clear 
evidence of recovery, announced a referendum on austerity measures that were 
imposed in the country. Criticism raised throughout the European Union, due to 
the  possible  destabilization  of  financial  panorama  in  the  short-term:  the 
referendum was blocked few days later, but it cost his resignation.  
  Looking back to the short history of the European Union, it is possible to 
find one precedent; in effect, the situation was similar to the referendum held by 
France in 1992 on the Maastricht Treaty. In that case, some national currencies 
were attacked because of the delay in the signing of the agreement; however, in 
2011, financial and international pressures prevailed on national sovereignty.  
The same delay shown with Greece occurred with Portugal. The loan was given 
only when the situation arrived to the edge of the precipice, i.e. the impossibility 
to pay public wages (Wise, 2011 and Traynor, 2011). The financial crisis of 
2010 reached Ireland, Belgium, France, Spain, but mostly Italy. Italy, with its 
enormous public debt, was the perfect candidate to be attacked. Even if the bank 
system was almost stable and the public deficit was put under a strict control by 
the former minister, Giulio Tremonti, under the supervision of Mario Draghi and 116    Davide VITTORI 
Jean-Claude Trichet
5, structural problems of growth and endemic tax evasion 
transformed Italy into a perfect victim. Europe looked at Italy as the “worst-case 
scenario” said a manager of Artio Global Equity Fund (BJGQX) in July (Baden, 
2011). The international press was aware of the danger (Pisa, 2011 and Aldeman 
and  Donadio,  2011)  but  the  Italian  economic  sovereignty  seemed  to  be 
untouchable,  despite  the ECB  letter  that tacitly  imposed some  reforms:  Italy 
could do on its own because its banking system was stable, according to Silvio 
Berlusconi (Rush, 2011); the rating agency and, in particular, Moody’s did not 
have  the  same  opinion  and,  a  month  before  Berlusconi’s  declaration, 
downgraded the outlook on the Italian banking system (Global Credit Research, 
2012). In the given situation, another plan for the bailout of the third economy in 
the EU was considered politically unsustainable, because it meant a consistent 
increase of the EU budget, stuck at the 1% of the GDP of all MS. Only when 
Berlusconi left, the spread between the Italian Buono del Tesoro and the German 
Bund decreased, after peaking 533 points on the 9
th of November.  
  Despite  the  intervention  in  the  Italian  domestic  debate  with  a  (not-so) 
secret letter, the ECB was stuck in its mandate: the price stability. Nevertheless, 
when the crisis became European, the ECB was forced to act in order to avoid a 
financial  disequilibrium:  the  Securities  Markets  Programme  (SMP)  was 
launched in May 2010 to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments 
that are dysfunctional. It was not properly a quantitative easing measure, but it 
was quite similar. The impact of SMP was less effective than it was expected. In 
fact, the worsening of the debt crisis in the European periphery led Mario Draghi 
(Bloomberg, 2012) to state that ECB would do “whatever it takes to save the 
euro”. Officially, the intervention in the secondary market planned in July 2012 
was realized to preserve price stability. In Mario Draghi’s words (2012): the 
outlook for the euro area economy as a whole was increasingly fragile. There 
were potentially negative consequences for Europe’s single market, as access to 
finance was increasingly influenced by location rather than creditworthiness and 
the quality of the project. The disruption of the monetary policy transmission 
[see Figure 1] is something deeply profound. It threatens the single monetary 
policy and the ECB’s ability to ensure price stability. This was why the ECB 
decided that action was essential. 
  Factually, the goal was to act within the mandate (without intervention in 
the primary market), but using non-conventional measures to avoid Italian and 
Spanish failure (Greece technically failed with a debt restructuring on March 
2012). The ambiguities of this tactics were necessary to overcome the criticism 
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of a reluctant German government that wanted to avoid the internal pressure 
with a view to the next legislative election; nonetheless, they also showed the 
lack of cohesion in the Eurosystem and, mostly, the historical low predictability 
of ECB behavior, as was already pointed out by the Ross IMF report ten years 
ago (2002). 
  After  three  years,  none  of  these  measures  were  able  to  prevent  the 
worsening  of  the  economic  crisis: the  General  government  gross  debt (%  of 
GDP) grew in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; the prospect of the IMF 
(2012) on the variation of the GDP at a constant price was, and still is, negative 
for all these countries. 
  What comes after is a recent story of a political failure. Whilst the issue of 
sovereignty  and  accountability  of  the  European  Union  emerged  strongly 
(Bassetts,  2011,  Babilar,  2011  and  Beck,  2011),  a  solution  for  a  deeper 
integration, that is the transformation of the ECB in the lender of last resort, was 
blocked by Germany, scared by the dangers of excessive inflation. According to 
Paul Krugman (2011) and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (in Franchon, 2011) this measure 
would have dissuaded the global market to speculate on Eurozone debts. In the 
extraordinary Council of the 9
thof December an agreement was reached with the 
opt-out of the British Prime Minister Cameron and of the Czech Prime Minister, 
on the austerity measures to be implemented at the European level. The Council 
decided that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) would come into force in 
July 2012. The Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism is not a 
completely new found: its predecessors were the EFSF and ESFM. Nonetheless, 
due  to  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Czech  Republic,  it  was 
transformed into an international organization located in Luxembourg, outside 
the institutional architecture of the European Union. After the approval of the 
German Constitutional Court on the 12
th of September 2012, it came into force 
at the end of the same month. The European Commission and the European 
Parliament,  in  this  context,  disappeared  from  the  debate.  The  former,  as  a 
guardian of the four freedoms, should have played a more significant role; this 
role, however, was not recognized as valid in a financial turmoil, as it was in 
1997 with the EDP procedure. 
Instead, within the European Union, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance  in  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (TSCG)  was  signed  in 
February 2012 (European Council 2012a): neither a proper fiscal union nor the 
Eurobonds  were  created.  The  new  Treaty  requires  national  budgets  to  be  in 
balance or in surplus: this goal will be achieved only if the annual structural 
government deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP. 
  Member States are asked to incorporate this "balanced budget rule" into 
their national legal systems, preferably at the constitutional level. The deadline 
for doing so is one year at the latest after the entry into force of the treaty. After 
the Council of Minister in December, Italy, following the example of Poland 118    Davide VITTORI 
(1997), Germany (2009) and Spain (August 2011), was one of the first Member 
State to modify its Constitution with a balanced budget amendment in April 
2012 (articles 81, 97, 117, 119)
6. 
  The excessive deficit procedure will also be more automatic. The Euro 
area member states commit to support the Commission's proposals except when 
a qualified majority of them would be against the decision. The recent elections 
in Greece, France and Germany showed that this slow-ripening decision was not 
appreciated by the electorate.  
   
Figure 2. A new European Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability 
 
Source: de Larosi￨re, 2009, p. 57 
 
  TSGC  and  ESM  are  considered  “complementary  in  fostering  fiscal 
responsibility  and  solidarity  within  the  economic  and  monetary  union” 
                                                       
6 The main parties (Partito Democratico, Popolo delle Libert￠, Unione dei Democratici 
di  Centro)  voted  those  modifications,  adding  some  exceptions  for  “harsh  economic 
recession”,  “financial  crisis”,  “natural  disasters”.  The  actual  economic  and  financial 
crisis is considered as part of those exceptions: in fact, Italy's public debt hit an all-time 
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(European  Council,  2012c,  p.  4);  both  require  Member  States  to  implement 
austerity measures in return for loans. In particular, the ESM established five 
supporting  programs  -  Sovereign  Bailout  Loan,  Bank  recapitalization, 
Precautionary  financial  assistance,  Primary  Market  Support  Facility  and 
Secondary  Market  Support  Facility  -  “on  the  basis of  a  strict  conditionality, 
appropriate  to  the  financial  assistance  instrument  chosen  if  indispensable  to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member 
States”  (European  Council,  2012c,  p.  5).  How  this  strict  conditionality  can 
propel “sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion” 
remains to be seen. What is clear, until now, is that the determination to take 
“the measures required to ensure a financially stable, competitive and prosperous 
Europe”  expressed  during  the  European  Council  of  June  2012  (European 
Council, 2012b) was not followed by an equal desire to maintain social and 
political stability in those countries crossed by popular upheaval against their 
Governments and the “troika”. Mostly, these measures came four years after the 
eruption  of  the  US  mortgages  crisis.  Considering  the  financial  perception  of 
Time, four years can be considered an enormity. These time laps should have 
been  used  to  implement  some  European  reforms,  but  it  served  to  rekindle 
soothed nationalism. 
 
6. Which remedies? 
  As Reiner Lenz (2011) shows in an interesting article, there are multiple 
explanations  for  the  crisis,  not  only  that  of  indecision  of  the  European 
institutions; probably one of the most important is the unequal distribution of 
debts in the Eurozone due to the imbalance in trade flows, but what lacks is, 
above all, a “European economic policy or economic government whose task 
would be to take preventive countermeasures with regard to differences in real 
wages”.  
  Nonetheless,  other  suggestions  were  made  in  2009  by  Jacques  de 
Larosi￨re. In his report several recommendations, among others, were proposed 
in order to stabilize the Bank system and to supervise the Credit Rating Agency 
(whose  role  in  the  economic  crisis  cannot  be  analyzed  here).  Firstly,  the 
overreliance  on  micro-prudential  regulation  neglected  the  issue  of  the 
macroeconomic  stability:  therefore,  monetary  authorities  “can  and  should 
implement a monetary policy that looks not only at the consumer prices, but also 
at  overall  monetary  and  credit  developments,  and  they  should  be  ready  to 
gradually tighten monetary policy when money or credit grow in an excessive 
and unsustainable manner” (de Larosi￨re, 2009. p. 14). Secondly, he proposed a 
substantial  reform  of  the  regulatory  framework;    it  should  be  based  on  the 
assumption that even if pro-cyclical measures have to be carefully evaluated in 
this recessive context (Slovik and Courn￨de, 2011), some aspects of new bank 120    Davide VITTORI 
regulations  have  to  be  implemented  (particularly,  the  minimum  capital 
requirements and promoting countercyclical buffers). The establishment of the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2011, as proposed in the de Larosi￨re 
Report, and the implementation of a so called “European Banking Union” seem 
a step forward in this regard. The latter will be operative in July 2013; for that 
reason an overall assessment on both reforms cannot be made. 
  However,  a  more  significant  problem  is  that  of  the  political  division 
among Member States. This division has left some fundamental issues for the 
European Union architecture unanswered, and they cannot be resolved only by 
technicians. After all, “the Greek crisis should have been resolved quite easily: 
after all, it’s the 3% of European GDP. It turned out in a titanic duty not for 
economic, but for political reasons” (Dass￹, 2001).  The possible solutions for 
the European political uncertainty may lay in a motto “more Europe, not less”. 
This is not  the  equivalent  of  a  Federal  State  similar  to  the  United  States  of 
America. Pragmatically, several measures should be discussed and implemented 
in order to avoid an inconsistent transportation from the EU level to the MS 
level, in order to reach a real harmonization set of rules in the EU. The final 
stage,  which  implies  a  significant  sovereignty  transfer  of  MS,  would  be  a 
European System of Financial Supervision (see Figure 2).  
  Moreover, a reform in the mandate of ECB/ESBC has to be put in the EU 
agenda; if it is not conceivable in the short term to modify radically the role of 
the ECB, it would be recommended to give to ECB “an explicit formal mandate 
to  assess  high  level  macro-financial  risks”  throughout  the  creation  of  a 
“European  Systemic  Risk  Council  (ESCR)”  whose  task  would  be  “to  form 
judgments and make recommendations on macro-prudential policy, issue risk 
warning, compare observation on macro-economic and prudential developments 
and give direction on these issues” (de Larosi￨re, 2009: 44). This does not mean 
that a political agreement, even if it had been reached in the first years of the 
crisis,  would  have  solved  the  structural  economic  problems  of  the  European 
Union. Nor a mere economic coordination will transform the European Union in 
a  political  and  democratic  space.  The  dilemma  about  how  an  elected 
Government can balance its executive power with the conditionality posed by 
international institutions is still unresolved; the problem of the EU Council’s 
accountability,  an  unelected  institution  that,  quoting  Habermas  “engages  in 
politics  without  being  authorized  to  do  so”  (Diez,  2011);  the  issue  of  the 
transparency of the ECB; the substantial distance - at least, perceived, as the 
recent Eurobarometer report shows (2013) - between “eurocrats” and citizens, 
with  the  raising  of  the  anti-system  movement  throughout  Europe
7: all these 
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disputes pose enormous challenges to the future of the Old Continent. The more 
political  are  the  answers  to  these  challenges,  the  more  likely  is  the  EU  to 
survive.  As  De  Grauwe  (2010)  suggested,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the 
survival of the Eurozone depends on its capacity to embed itself into a political 
union. The latter must imply some transfer of sovereignty in the conduct of 
macroeconomic policies other than monetary policies and the organization of 
minimal forms of automatic solidarity between member states even when some 
of  these  have  misbehaved.  The  lack  of  a  “real”  accountability  of  some 
supranational institutions, such as the ECB or the IMF - or even the European 
Commission  -  hides  a  deeper  problem,  i.e.  the  withdrawal  of  politics  in  the 
European  arena.  In  that  sense,  austerity  measures  are  not  only  an  economic 
issue, which can be discussed by specialists, but mostly a political affair that 
needs  a  public  discussion  among  citizens.  In  this  perspective,  reducing  the 
“democratic  deficit”  (Follesdal  and  Hix,  2006)  of  the  European  Union,  by 
politicizing the economic, financial and fiscal issues rather than imagine them as 
an objective matter of fact, would be a good starting point. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  Social sciences – and economics among them - are not hard sciences; for 
that reason, it is impossible to demonstrate that a political union would have 
certainly  prevented  the shift  from  the  mortgages  crisis  to  the sovereign  debt 
crisis  in  Europe.  In  my  paper,  I  underline  the  role  that  a  more  coordinated 
political action would probably have eased the fury of the speculation among the 
Eurozone,  as  the  Greek  bailout  and  the  cases  of  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal 
demonstrated. The EU architecture was not ready to face the challenges that the 
financial turmoil caused: the first symptoms of this unsuitableness can be found 
in the problems faced in applying the Stability and Growth Pact; however, the 
interest rates bonanza in the last ten years delayed any pressure to reform the 
financial and political systems. It is not surprising, therefore, that since 2008, the 
electoral  calculus  had  the  preeminence  in  the  MSs  agendas  with  respect  to 
comprehensive European political and economic reforms and that ECB, faithful 
to its mandate, preferred a tough monetarist policy rather than implementing 
counter-cyclical  measures.  Economic  national  sovereignty,  after  the  loss  of 
monetary policy, was a primary concern for all MSs even before the eruption of 
the  sovereign  debt  crisis.  With  the  financial  turmoil,  this  tendency  was 
strengthen:  the  recent  European  Councils  demonstrated  that  watered-down 
compromise with very limited objectives was the only point which MSs were to 
able agree on.  
                                                                                                                                   
in Italy, there is a growing consensus among members of these parties on the inability of  
traditional parties to answer to the financial and economic crisis. 122    Davide VITTORI 
  Even the ESM and TSGC seem an arrangement between the necessity to 
safeguard financial stability in the EU, especially in its southern periphery, and 
the austerity (and pro-cyclical) measures required by the so-called troika, as well 
as by Germany and other northern neighbors: no evidence of actual willingness 
to implement a binding mechanism of political coordination among European 
institutions  can  be  found.  The  recent  Cyprus  bailout  seems  to  confirm  this 
tendency: in this case, the European Parliament was able to react only with ex-
post statement to a decision taken elsewhere.  Nevertheless, the scenario may be 
less dark than it is frequently depicted if only a whole reform of the political 
architecture of the EU would be implemented in the next years. The starting 
point of this reform should be a more coherent regulatory financial framework 
and  a  new  conception  of  the  ECB  mandate  that  allow  ECB  itself  to  act  by 
pursuing macro-prudential stability. Finally, a slow path toward a more balanced 
fiscal policy should be undertaken, despite the fact that the current financial and 
economic crisis does not allow a grand bargain among MSs. The priority is for 
the short-term,  but,  without  imagining  a  long-term  transformation  of  the  EU 
policy-making, none of these short-term reforms will succeed. 
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